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overvIew — Medicaid costs for health and long-term care services for 
low-income individuals are substantial. As a result, each state’s “match 
rate,” or federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP), which determines 
the share of Medicaid benefit costs the federal government pays, has enormous 
implications for state budgets and state economies, as well as for Medicaid 
beneficiaries and providers. Shifts in the FMAP from year to year, even minor 
ones, can mean the gain or loss of tens or hundreds of millions of federal 
matching dollars, depending on the size of the state’s Medicaid program. 
This paper explains the FMAP formula, examines the limitations of this 
method for distributing federal Medicaid financing, and highlights options 
to address the formula’s shortcomings.
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How the FMAP Formula Works 
and Why It Falls Short
Medicaid financing policy has long been a source of tension between fed-
eral and state governments, which finance the program jointly, as well as 
an issue of debate among analysts and policymakers. The level of federal 
financial support for each state’s Medicaid program and the way it is cal-
culated (the federal medical assistance percentage, or FMAP, formula) are 
concerns of program supporters and critics alike. Medicaid’s individual 
entitlement ensures federal subsidization of health care for low-income 
families and individuals and allows states financial flexibility for program 
expansions. At the same time, however, the entitlement, coupled with the 
longstanding methodology for determining the level of federal support 
for each state Medicaid program, creates incentives for states to maximize 
or enhance the federal share of Medicaid costs, sometimes to an extreme, 
which adds strain to the federal-state partnership. 
The design and role of the FMAP formula in Medicaid financing policy is 
viewed by some as the origin of many of the program’s problems, including 
the growth of federal and state Medicaid spending, program fraud and 
abuse, adversarial relationships between states and the federal government, 
questionable state accounting schemes, and more.1 While the FMAP’s role 
in contributing to these problems has more to do with the entitlement and 
overall Medicaid financing policy (for example, minimum federal match-
ing rates and federal expenditures driven by state-determined levels of 
program spending) and less to due with the specific FMAP formula, the 
current FMAP formula does have its shortcomings. 
The FMAP formula is criticized for not accurately accounting for states’ 
ability to fund Medicaid services, for not adequately reflecting the excess 
burdens placed on states with high concentrations of poor persons, and 
for not being sufficiently responsive to current state economic conditions. 
As a result, many argue that the FMAP formula leaves states vulnerable to 
funding shortfalls at exactly the wrong time—when economic conditions 
create the greatest need for public services like Medicaid. 
During an economic downturn, state revenues become stagnant or decline, 
while Medicaid enrollment increases as people lose their jobs and the 
health care coverage that comes with them. Since all but one state have 
balanced budget requirements, choices have to be made between increased 
taxes and decreased public services. As the second-largest item in most 
state budgets, Medicaid programs and their eligibility levels, benefits, and 
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provider payments are often at risk for cuts during a recession. (See text 
box below for discussion of proposals to aid states.) 
Both state and federal officials have a lot at stake with Medicaid and its 
financing structure. A downturn in the economy highlights the tensions 
within the financing framework and the impact of the FMAP. Whether 
they are examining options to address specific aspects of Medicaid’s fis-
cal problems or looking at ways to improve the overall responsiveness 
of federal financial assistance, understanding the FMAP formula and its 
economic Stimulus: using the fmap to assist States During the recession
As part of a stimulus package to stabilize the 
nation’s economy, Congress is considering a 
temporary increase in the FMAP. Both the House 
and the Senate have included provisions in eco-
nomic stimulus bills to temporarily boost FMAP 
percentages in an effort to head off state budget 
cuts in Medicaid. H.R. 7110 proposed increasing 
all states’ FMAPs by at least 1 percentage point, 
and possibly an additional one to three percent-
age points, depending on various factors (that is, 
state unemployment rates, foreclosure rates, and 
food stamps participation). S. 3689 proposed an 8 
percentage point increase across the board for all 
states. Both proposals required states to maintain 
FY 2008 Medicaid eligibility standards during 
the months the increased FMAP was provided. A 
temporary increase in the FMAP is viewed as an 
ideal way to provide federal assistance because it 
gives immediate financial relief to states, shores 
up state Medicaid programs, and automatically 
reverts to regular FMAP levels.
These efforts mark the second time in this decade 
that Congress has attempted to use the FMAP 
to temporarily infuse federal funds to states. 
The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation 
Act of 2003 provided $10 billion in fiscal relief 
through a temporary FMAP increase of 2.95 
percentage points for each state for five fiscal 
quarters in 2003 and 2004. States also received 
an additional $10 billion in federal grants for 
general purpose assistance. To receive the higher 
FMAP, states could not lower their Medicaid 
eligibility thresholds during the time this fiscal 
relief was in effect. 
According to the Congressional Budget Office, 
more than half of the states reported that the 
increased matching rates enabled them either to 
avoid or delay making cuts or to make smaller 
cuts to their Medicaid program.* Indeed, the 
National Governors Association has stated that 
the influx of federal assistance helped states meet 
Medicaid expenditure increases that were driven 
by the economic downturn, forestalled additional 
reductions in Medicaid, and preserved Medicaid 
eligibility levels. 
Opponents contend, however, that this solution 
for shoring up Medicaid does not necessarily 
translate to increased federal funding for the 
program. A temporary increase in the FMAP 
reduces the amount of funding that states need 
to spend on Medicaid to provide the same level 
of Medicaid services. There is no guarantee or 
requirement that states use all of the additional 
federal funds in their Medicaid programs. Since 
Medicaid federal matching funds are provided on 
a retrospective basis to reimburse states for past 
expenditures, anticipation of the higher FMAP 
allows states to redirect the additional funds 
anywhere in their budgets.† 
* Peter R. Orszag, Congressional Budget Office, Options for Respond-
ing to Short-term Economic Weakness, testimony before the U.S. 
Senate Finance Committee, January 22, 2008; available at www.cbo.
gov/ftpdocs/89xx/doc8932/1-22-TestimonyEconStimulus.htm. 
† Robert B. Helms, American Enterprise Institute, State Fiscal 
Relief: Protecting Health Coverage in an Economic Downturn, 
testimony before the U.S. House Energy and Commerce Committee, 
Subcommittee on Health, July 22, 2008; available at www.aei.org/
docLib/20080723_22July2008.pdf.
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limitations is important to policymakers considering changes to any aspect 
of Medicaid financing policy.
the feDeral Share of meDIcaID expenDItureS
Each state’s FMAP is determined annually by a statutory formula designed 
to account for income variation across the states.2 For fiscal year (FY) 
2009, FMAP percentages range from 50 percent in California and several 
other states to 75.84 percent in Mississippi. (See 
Table 1 for the FY 2009 FMAP for all states.) 
Overall, the use of this formula has resulted in 
the federal government’s financing a relatively 
constant average of 57 percent of all Medicaid 
costs annually.3 Except for Puerto Rico and the 
territories, there is no cap on most Medicaid 
amounts the federal government pays: the more 
a state spends, the more it receives from the 
federal government. 
This financing arrangement provides an in-
centive for states to commit resources to their 
Medicaid programs: the higher a state’s FMAP, 
the stronger the incentive. With an FMAP of 50 
percent, for every dollar a state spends on Med-
icaid, the federal government contributes one 
dollar; with an FMAP of 75 percent, the federal 
contribution is three dollars per state dollar. 
Likewise, whenever a state cuts its Medicaid 
spending, it will forgo the federal share. A state 
with a FMAP of 75 percent, for example, has a 
reduction of three federal dollars for every state 
dollar it cuts, for a total reduction in Medicaid 
spending of four dollars.
the fmap formula
Personal income is the key variable in the FMAP 
formula. The formula is based on rolling three-
year average per capita income data for each 
state and the United States, produced by the 
Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic 
Analysis.4 The Medicaid statute sets forth how a 
state’s share of Medicaid costs is to be calculated: 
the state share equals the square of a state’s per 
capita income divided by the square of U.S. 
per capita income, multiplied by 0.45. It also 
defines the federal share as 100 percent minus 
the state share. 






























federal medical assistance percentages (fmap), 
fy 2009





























Source: Federal Register 72, no. 228, November 28, 2007, p. 67304.
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The formula for the state share can be expressed as follows.4
State Share = 0.45 x [State per capita Income2/u.S. per capita Income2]
Therefore, the federal share can be expressed as:
fmap = 1 - 0.45 x [State per capita Income2/u.S. per capita Income2]
The formula was established in statute when Medicaid was authorized in 
1965.6 It is designed to pay a higher FMAP to states with lower per capita 
income relative to the national average, such as Mississippi, and a lower 
FMAP to states with higher per capita income relative to the national av-
erage, such as Washington. The state multiplier of 0.45 ensures that states 
with average per capita income, such as Pennsylvania, receive a federal 
share of 55 percent. The goal of this formula structure is to reduce differ-
ences among states in medical care coverage for low-income people and 
to distribute fairly the burden of financing program benefits among the 
states so that states able to shoulder a bigger share of their costs do.
The statute establishes a minimum FMAP of 50 percent for states, stipulat-
ing that no state shall bear more than 50 percent of total costs, regardless 
of the result of applying the formula. Thirteen states have FMAPs equal 
to the 50 percent floor in 2009. The statute also contains an upper FMAP 
limit of 83 percent. The FMAP formula also does not apply to the terri-
tories, which are subject to an annual cap on federal Medicaid matching 
funds. Their FMAP is defined in the statute as 50 percent: the federal 
government pays 50 percent of the cost of Medicaid items and services 
up to the spending caps. In addition, the statute sets a 70 percent FMAP 
for the District of Columbia
The FMAP applies to state expenditures for most medical services and 
medical insurance services.7 It does not apply to expenditures for certain 
services (for example, family planning services and supplies), specified 
populations (for example, Native Americans and Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention–identified uninsured women with breast or cervical cancer), 
or Medicaid administrative costs.8 Federal matching percentages for these 
services and populations are specified separately under federal law. 
The Secretary of Health and Human Services publishes the FMAP between 
October 1 and November 30 each year. The FMAP is in effect for a one-year 
period, beginning the following federal fiscal year. For example, FMAP 
percentages for FY 2009 were published in the Federal Register in November 
2007 and went into effect October 1, 2008. 
a flaweD formula
The FMAP formula has long been criticized. Many analysts and poli-
cymakers are concerned that the FMAP formula does not adequately 
reflect the differences among states’ fiscal capacities, concentrations of 
low-income citizens, or service delivery costs. The FMAP formula also 
is criticized for not adequately responding to changes in individual state 
economic circumstances over time.9 The reliance on per capita personal 
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income for determining the federal match is blamed for many of these 
shortcomings.
State resources, the number of people in poverty, and the cost of serving 
people in poverty are all indicators of two criteria that the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) has said are appropriate for allocating fed-
eral funds: a state’s ability to pay for health care services and the level of 
need of its citizens. Neither of these is adequately reflected in per capita 
personal income data, according to the GAO. Per capita income measures 
income received by state residents, such as wages, rents, and interest 
income, but it does not include taxable state product that minimally af-
fects income data. This omission can result in the understatement of state 
resources, as occurs in the case of energy-exporting states, such as Alaska 
and Wyoming, and in the case of states that house numerous corporate 
headquarters, such as Delaware. 
Per capita income also is not a good proxy for the differences in the cost of 
providing health care services to a state’s Medicaid beneficiaries. Elderly 
individuals typically cost more to serve than adults and children, and states 
with similarly low per capita incomes can have very different proportions 
of elderly persons potentially eligible for Medicaid . In addition, to the ex-
tent per capita income does not reflect service cost differences, the FMAP 
formula does not truly reflect the burden on states with higher costs.
The GAO further argues that per capita income is “a poor measure of the 
size of states’ poverty populations”10 and therefore is a poor reflection of 
state-by-state beneficiary need. Two states with similar per capita incomes, 
for example, can vary widely in their percentages of people in poverty. In 
fact, a state with a relatively high per capita 
income and therefore a low FMAP percentage 
(for example, New York, which has an FMAP 
of 50 percent), can have a high concentration of 
people living in poverty. 
Finally, there is a substantial time lag in the col-
lection and calculation of the rolling three-year 
average per capita income data by the Com-
merce Department. As a result, FMAP percent-
ages that are in effect are based on income data 
from three to six years earlier. Using a three-year 
average per capita income aids state budget 
planning by making the FMAP more stable 
and predictable.11 However, the data lag for 
three-year average per capita income prevents 
the FMAP formula from responding quickly in 
the short term to economic downturns.12 Since 
state economic growth can change dramatically 
within a year or two, this lack of responsiveness 
can leave states in a financial bind (see text box). 
why fmap Is not countercyclical
The inherent time lag in the FMAP formula means that 
some states receive lower FMAPs when their economies 
are performing poorly, because the per capita income 
data used is from a period when the state economy was 
stronger. As a result, when those states need greater 
financial assistance from the federal government to 
maintain their Medicaid programs’ coverage, benefits, 
and provider payments during a time of fiscal crisis, the 
FMAP formula prevents them from getting it. As an ex-
ample, states with the highest foreclosure rates (Florida, 
Arizona, and Nevada) will receive FMAPs in FY 2010 
based on personal income data from 2005 through 2007, 
when their economies were booming. Florida’s reduced 
FMAP in FYs 2009 and 2010 will mean that the state would 
have to add almost $300 million in state funds in FY 2010 
to maintain its FY 2008 program.
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The poor economic conditions of states for FY 2009, for example, will not 
begin to be reflected in FMAP calculations until FY 2012, at the earliest; at 
that point, the FMAP will be based on per capita income data from 2007 
through 2009. 
a more reSponSIve fmap?
Proposals to revise the FMAP formula and/or how it is applied have been 
discussed over the years. Many of these address concerns of equity and 
responsiveness to state economic conditions. Modifying a formula that 
has been in place since 1965, however, generates “winners” and “losers” 
among the states. The Equitable Federal Medicaid Assistance Percentage 
Act of 1999, for example, sought to “replace the per 
capita income factor with an indicator to reflect the 
mismatch between state resources and the number 
of low-income residents in need of health care 
services.”13 The proposed formula called for both 
a more comprehensive measure of state resources 
that would be adjusted for cross-state differences 
in the cost of health care services and a measure of people in need of ser-
vices based on state poverty rates adjusted for state differences in cost of 
living. The GAO found this proposal “would substantially shift federal 
Medicaid funding among the states,” reducing some states’ FMAPs and 
increasing those of others. The new formula also would result in greater 
overall federal funding of the Medicaid program. 
Other proposals focus on modifying the application of the FMAP formula. 
These include shortening the time period for which average per capita 
income is calculated and establishing a “trigger,” such as an increase in 
state or national unemployment rates, that leads to automatic, temporary 
increases in the FMAP when the economy slows down dramatically within 
a state or nationally.14
The shorter time period for determining per capita income would allow 
changes in economic conditions to be accounted for sooner and would 
help avoid “procyclical FMAPs” where some states have higher FMAPs 
during better economic times because the income data are from a period 
when the state economy was weaker. This change would address the 
general responsiveness of the FMAP formula, although some time lag 
would likely always exist. The automatic trigger approach for temporary 
increases in FMAP based on unemployment data could be targeted to 
assist only states facing difficult economic conditions, a large set of states 
with economic downturns, or all states. While this alternative would not 
address the sensitivity of the current FMAP formula with regard to gen-
eral fluctuations in economic conditions, it would provide the states with 
predictable, automatic federal relief during more severe situations, such 
as a recession, when the threshold for the trigger is met.
the poor economic conditions of states 
for fy 2009 will not begin to be reflected 
in fmap calculations until fy 2012, at 
the earliest.
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concluSIon
Medicaid program financing is not easily directed or controlled, particu-
larly when the economy is performing poorly. It is not designed to be. As a 
major line item in state budgets and the largest source of federal grant sup-
port to states, both state and federal governments have a substantial fiscal 
interest in Medicaid and how well both coverage and costs can be managed. 
Predictable federal funding through the FMAP formula allows states to 
better plan their budgets in general and prevent deep program cuts in 
times of recession and budget shortfalls. The limitations of the current 
formula, however, can make this a challenge. Morever, these limitations 
can leave states shouldering a larger share of the Medicaid cost burden, 
during a state or national economic crisis. 
Addressing the limitations of this longstanding formula will raise many 
questions, including the following:
What is the best way to update a formula with many state “winners”  Q
and “losers” in a time when overall budget neutrality is critical for 
federal and state governments?
Is changing the current FMAP formula and its application the key to  Q
ensuring countercyclical financing, or should the provision of federal 
funds to states during economic downturns be addressed through 
other means?
Is it possible to overcome political obstacles to change? Q
Until the shortcomings of the FMAP formula are addressed, states and 
the federal government will continue to face challenges in managing 
Medicaid costs and coverage, particularly during times of poor economic 
performance. As Medicaid costs increase in the future, especially but not 
exclusively in response to our aging population, the issue will grow in 
importance.
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